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Introduction
Apart from demand and supply conditions, todays EC trade in ag-
ricultural products is determined not only by classical trade
policy instruments, e.g. customs or quotas, but in addition by
numerous internal instruments influencing consumption, production
and storage. The protective character originates from specific
sectoral policy goals having a long tradition in most of the six
founding members of the EC. With the first and second enlargement
of the EC the protective effects on third countries (trade di-
version) aggravated not only because of the geographical exten-
sion, but because more and more products had been included in the
protective system, respectively protection rates for some prod-
ucts had been increased due to demands of new member countries.
During this process conflicts in objectives between internal
producer demands and that of trade partners, being not members of
the EC, became apparent. They were tackled in different ways,
depending on the commodities and countries involved. Trade rela-
tions with developed countries, competing on markets for basic
food commodities, e.g. grains, sugar, beef and milk products
became increasingly impaired and the first serious attempt for a
general reduction of trade barriers is only now undertaken in the
GATT-Uruguay Round. Trade policy towards DCs was characterized by
more cooperative approaches. The reasons are twofold. First, and
most importantly, agricultural commodities produced in DCs are
substitutes to EC-produced goods only to a small extent, either
in production or in consumption. Secondly, there are some
political commitments towards DCs in general or with respect to
specific country groups such as the former colonies of France and
the UK (now ACP-countries) or the mediterranean countries, where
in the latter case geopolitical objectives are on the background
of trade concessions.
In the following the major rules and exceptions for EC trade with
DCs in unprocessed agricultural commodities will be outlined in
some detail and then an overview will be given over more recent
estimates of the impact of these regulations. What follows fi-
nally is a short discussion of positions and options in the
Uruguay Round with respect to agriculture.- 2 -
1 Systems and Exceptions
When discussing EC trade policies towards developing countries in
the field of agricultural commodities some remarks with respect
to the scope and coverage of the analysis are necessary. As men-
tioned before, the EC has no uniform consistent trade policy
regime. Rather there is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
covering the vaste majority of products grown within the EC. The
CAP encompasses different market intervention systems depending
on the product and - in addition - with numerous exceptions in
trade regulations, often for single products and countries. The
other broad group of commodities, not included in the CAP, are
tropical fruits and beverages, spices and agricultural raw mate-
rials for industrial use. For these products GATT regulations and
the different preference systems for DCs in general or certain
groups of DCs are relevant. A group of commodities in between
these two basic categories are grain substitutes such as oil-
seeds, oilcakes, grain by-products (e.g. bran, corn gluten feed,
maize germ oilcake), citrus pulp or other protein feeding stuffs
for which trade is relatively liberal and in accordance with
GATT rules while EC production of close substitutes or even the
same products (some oilseeds) is highly protected.
Not all regulations can be discussed. What is considered im-
portant will be defined in a pragmatic way, because even standard
statistical criteria such as export shares for certain commodi-
ties and/or countries might be misleading since a low share could
be just the result of the regulation in question and vice versa.
Furthermore, a clear cut definition of 'trade policy
1 and 'to-
wards developing countries' is not possible, if trade and trans-
fer effects for DCs are to be analysed. Again, a pragmatic defi-
nition including all policy measures having major trade or
transfer effects seems to be adequate, since measures directed
towards developed countries will also have - via substituion in
production and trade diversion - significant effects on DCs.- 3 -
1.1 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
With two minor exceptions - potatoes and alcohol - the markets of
all commodities produced within the EC are regulated in one or
the other way by Common Market Organisations. Since all organ-
isations are ruled by the basic principles of 'market unity
1,
'community preference' and 'common financial responsibility' the
basic feature of the CAP is protective. However, the resulting
internal allocation of resources and ,therefore, the trade ef-
fects for different commodities depend greatly on the intruments
applied and the policy pursued. Of major relevance are the yearly
decisions on prices taken by the Council of Ministers. The highly
complex and differentiated market regulations for agricultural
products could be classified into four broad categories :
Internal market support prices combined with external protec-
tion by levies and/or customs duties. Relevant for most cere-
als, sugar, milk, beef and veal, pig meat, certain fruit and
vegetables, table wine and fishery products, covering more
than 70 p.c. of total agricultural production.
2
Internal support prices for producers and liberal trade , i.e.
deficiency payment systems with low prices (for consumers re-
spectively the processing industry) for olive oil (with cer-
tain specification), some oilseeds, tobacco, mutton and rai-
sins covering about 3 per cent of production.
External protection exclusively for flowers, wine other than
table wine, other fruit and vegetables, eggs and poultry,
covering about 25 per cent of production.
Flat rate aid based on acreage or output for durum wheat,
cotton-, flax- and hempseed, hops, silkworms, seeds and dehy-
drated fodder, covering about 1 per cent of production.
For a detailed presentation and discussion of the EC market
regulations for agricultural products see OECD, 1987; BAE,
1985; Agra-Europe, Nr. 27/1985 and Nr. 44/1985 Dokumentation.
Here the numbers of the respective EC regulations could be
found.
2
For several products the common customs tariff is applied for
others (e.g. bran) an import levy or a customs quota combined
with a VER (manioc) is introduced.- 4 -
This classification is not unequivocal in the sense that the
instruments of each category are the only ones applied to the
commodities included in the category. Since the dominating ob-
jective of the CAP is the protection of producers, not surpris-
ingly, the common feature of all four 'systems' is the increase
of producer incomes above free market levels. Since this is
brought about by price support or production-tied aid, it in-
creases internal production and reduces imports or/and pushes
(subsidized) exports above free trade levels. Nevertheless, the
broad variety of instruments applied leads to different effects
on quantities traded and on world market prices which should be
discussed in some length.
1. The core instruments of the levy system are threshold prices
at the border and an intervention price both derived from the
target price, fixed by the yearly decisions of the Council of
Ministers. The intervention price, at which all quantities could
be sold to market authorities, functions as a guaranteed minimum
price. The levy, fixed frequently by market authorities for im-
ports to the EC, amounts to the difference between lowest offer
prices (grain; but not for fruit and vegetables, pig meat, poul-
try, eggs) and the threshold price. For exports the price diffe-
rence between (usually higher) EC and world market prices is com-
pensated by export subsidies (restitutions) which could be diffe-
rentiated with respect to country of destination. Export subsi-
dies and their regional differentiation in particular, are the
cause of permanent quarrel in GATT panels and a major point in
the agricultural section of the Uruguay Round.
Increasing degrees of selfsufficiency as a logical consequence of
the support system, shifting the EC from a net importer to a net
exporter for most basic food commodities, lead to a continuous
sharp increase in budgetary costs of the agricultural policy. To
curb this spending, additional instruments for supply control had
been implemented. In addition to sugar, where a slightly flexible
quota system was applied since the beginning of the common mar-
ket, production quotas were introduced for milk producers in
1984. Moreover, guarantee thresholds for total EC production were- 5 -
applied for cereals (first time 1982/83), milk (1977/78, com-
bined with a co-responsibility levy) and oilseeds (rape seed
1982/83). If this quantity is surpassed by the actual production,
automatic cuts in guarantee prices should have been the conse-
quence. However, these mechanisms were hardly applied conse-
quently until 1988.
For several commodities, e.g. beef and veal, live cattle, fruit
and vegetables variable levies on imports were combined with a
customs duty. The levy amounts to the difference between offer
price plus customs duty and the guide price (cattle and veal) or
3
the reference price (fruit and vegetables). Of particular rele-
vance with respect to imports is the fact that price competition
between foreign suppliers is eliminated in the case of fruit and
vegetables, because price differentials in individual offers at
the border are levelled by variable levies. In principal the same
effect is achieved for pig meat, eggs and poultry, when the un-
dercutting of the 'sluice-gate' price, an administratively fixed
minimum offer price, is matched by an extra countervailing
surcharge.
Apart from these principal instruments applied on markets with
internal and trade intervention, numerous other regulations as
e.g. premiums for consumers (olive oil) or producers (cattle)
processing aids (oranges) etc. are applied but cannot be discus-
sed further. Major exceptions of the application of the trade
regime are preferential quotas for imports of live cattle and
beef which were fixed at 210 000 head live cattle and 186 486 t
3
Reference prices are calculated on the basis of EC production
costs. They are fixed only for the marketing season of the
respective product. The products covered are (1) cherries,
cucumbers, zucchinis, plums and (2) peaches, pears, apples,
table grapes, oranges, mandarines, lemons, tomatoes, cauli-
flowers (since 1982/83), apricots and aubergines. Whereas the
first group belongs to the third category of commodities men-
tioned above (external protection only), for the latter group
(category (2)) which is considered of particular importance for
producers, 'base' prices and 'buying in' prices are fixed. Base
prices represent a price level which producers should 'normal-
ly' obtain on the markets. 'Buying in* prices are in the range
of 40-70 per cent of the base prices, depending on the commo-
dity.- 6 -
of beef in 1988. The latter's share in EEC's total beef consump-
tion amounts to only 2,7 per cent (Schnoor, 1989, p. 15), but it
is of special relevance for certain countries and will be dis-
cussed below in more detail. The same holds for an import quota
of 1,3 mill, t white sugar equivalent from ACP countries and
preferential trade agreements with Mediterranean Countries which
are important for fruit and vegetables.
2. The second category with internal support prices and liberal
trade encompasses quite heterogenous products and a multitude of
instruments. They include variable slaughter subsidies, subsidies
4
for ewes (sheep and goat meat) and processing aid, paid to the
first buyer of oilseeds. The general consequence of having a
deficiency payment system for certain products while markets for
close subsitutes are highly protected are severe distortions in
the consumption and trade structure. This is of particular im-
portance for the markets of grain and grain substitutes, i.e.
oilcakes and other protein feeding stuff in combination with
manioc. In compound feed expensive grain is substituted to a
large extent by sheaper components. From 1978 (EC-9) to 1987
(EC-12) the import quantity of grain substitutes increased from
12 mill, t to 18 mill, t (grain by-products, manioc, citrus pulp)
and that of soybean and soybean cake from 18 to 22 mill, t
(Agrarbericht 1988, p. 124; USDA, oilseeds). At the same time the
EC's trade balance for grain shifted from a net import of 12
mill, t to a net export of 17 mill, t (1987/88) and is estimated
at a surplus of 26,6 mill, t in 1989/90 (USDA, Grains). Beside
the United States as the major exporter of soybean and other
protein feeding stuff, Brazil and Argentina for soybeans and
Thailand as the by far dominating exporter of manioc have par-
ticular interests in this EC trade arrangements which are on the
agenda of the ongoing GATT negotiations. However, with respect to
the relatively liberal EC import regime for grain substitutes, it
is; worthwhile to note that the EC still seeks to limit the import
of grain substitutes. The agricultural lobby demands tariffs on
In addition to this producer subsidies there is an external
customs duty of 20 p.c. (ad valorem) bound in GATT.- 7 -
imports of oilseeds and there is an import substitution policy
consisting of above average protection of EC-produced protein
feeding stuff (oilseeds, peas, beans, etc.) and high premiums for
using EC-produced commodities (oilcakes, milk powder) in compound
feed.
3. External protection as the only protective instrument is
relevant for certain fruits and vegetables for which no internal
intervention system exists. The customs duty applied varies be-
tween 4 and 21 per cent, depending besides on the season and on
the processing stage of the commodity in question (OECD, 1987, p.
186). A definite other group of commodities belonging to this
category are poultry and eggs. The border protection is brought
about by a levy which consists of two components. The first
component is the difference between the feed costs per unit at
world market and EC prices and the second is a 7 per cent duty on
the sluice gate price (calculated minimum production costs under
world market condition). A supplementary amount is charged on
offers below the sluice gate price.
4. Flat rate aid based on acreage or output is the main or only
instrument for a number of commodities mentioned on p. 3. For
durum wheat it is an additional support measure only since the
conventional levy system, described above, applies. In general
flat rate aid has principally the same effects on trade as defi-
ciency payment systems. The quantitative impact depends on the
policy pursued and is directed towards import substitution. The
number of commodities covered by this policy has expanded since
the foundation of the EC mostly as a consequence of the second
enlargement by Mediterranean Countries. They are growing products
which are of minor importance to the old member countries.
Summarizing the brief outline of the basic systems of the CAP
given above, some preliminary conclusions could be drawn on po-
tential trade and price effects with respect to non-member coun-
tries. Given the general policy objective to protect producers
(raise producer income) the principal effects are an increase in- 8 -
5
production and exports, shrinking imports and depressed prices
on world markets. However, besides the economic conditions dif-
fering between commodities, the various systems itself applied to
different commodities have an impact on the outcome. The levy-
system is the most perfect system shielding the internal market
against developments on international markets. Since the EC has
high shares in most markets, prices on world markets not only
have been depressed, but in addition, instability has been in-
creased as a consequence of the variable levy which stabilizes
the internal prices. Beyond that, competition between foreign
suppliers is reduced on that markets, where the levy is not based
on the minimum offer price, but is defined just as the difference
between given offer and regulated EC-price. Compared to this
system, markets regulated by flat rate aid or external customs
duties only are much less delinked from world markets since con-
sumers and producers within the EC could react on fluctuations of
world market prices. To a limited extent this is also true for a
deficiency payment system since at least consumers and processing
industries of raw products are confronted with changing market
conditions. Given the same level of effective protection for
producers of different commodities, trade effects are smaller in
a deficiency payment system or under flat rate aid than in the
case of levies or customs duties. Nominal rates of protection are
lower in the first case, and internal consumption higher than in
the latter cases. Similar effective rates and nominal rates of
5
Policies increasing farmers income without raising production
are theoretically possible in two ways. (1) Paying direct in-
come transfers to farmers which give no incentive for produc-
tion increases. This kind of policy, heavily debated among
agricultural economists for decades entered the debate in on-
going GATT negotiations under the term 'decoupling
1, i.e. de-
coupling price and income policy. Although several instruments
which could have an reduced impact on production compared to
price policy are known and sometimes even applied, transfers to
farmers which are neutral with respect to production are not
known in practice. (2) As the by far dominating instrument is -
up to now - the producer price, the combination with production
quotas is a straight forward way to limit production increases
and resulting trade effects. Letting aside negative internal
allocative and distributional effects, a precondition for ef-
ficient application is the controllability of supply, which is
given only for few commodities.- 9 -
protection for close substitutes in production and consumption
limit the allocative distortions. In reality, diverging effective
rates and extremely different nominal rates for close substi-
tutes, brought about by the CAP, lead to an aggravation of trade
distortions for a given average protection as, e.g. discussed
above for grain and substitutes.
1.2 EC-Trade in Agricultural Commodities under GATT-Rules
Whereas the greater part of the EC production is covered purely
by a levy system , in relation to imports of agricultural commo-
dities this is - due to the system and the price policy pursued -
a shrinking part of about 15 per cent; 43 per cent of imports
were subject to customs duties and 42 p.c. are totally excempt
(OECD, 1987, p. 85). Imports not regulated by a variable levy
system fall under the 'Common Customs Tariff (CCT). CCT includes
MFN tariffs, some quantitative concessions for beef imports
(Schnoor, 1989, p. 16) and several more general arrangements for
trade in meat and dairy products (OECD, 1987, p. 28). The MFN
rates vary according to the product and the season for certain
fruits and vegetables. With respect to their impact on EC im-
ports, they are of hardly any (beef) or at most minor importance
for commodities, for which additional levies are charged. For
other products covered by the CAP, their impact depends on EC
measures effecting internal supply and demand of the same product
7
or close substitutes in production or consumption.
As discussed above, there are several products where a variable
levy plus a customs duty apply e.g. for live cattle and beef
and fruit and vegetables. The definition of 'levy-systems'
might be not unequivocal since e.g. the system for fruit and
vegetables is frequently not included. But even if the 'coun-
tervailing charge
1 levied on imports is officially not called a
levy, it functions in the same way as the variable levies in
the other market organizations.
The classification of import products being competing or non-
competing (OECD, 1987, p. 188) is not particularly helpful as
far as, e.g. oilseeds are classified 'non-competing' but in
reality are competing not only in consumption (compound feed
and vegetable oils) but also in production.- 10 -
Table: EC MFN Rates for Agricultural Commodities,
- per cent -
Product Category MFN Tariff Rate
beef, cattle
mutton
vegetables, fresh or chilled
fruit provisionally preserved, but































subject to a levy






Source: Amelung, Langhammer 1989, p. 45; Menzler-Hokkanen, 1988.
p. 90.
The main characteristics of the CCT tariff structure are:
Low or zero rates for tropical beverages and industrial raw
materials;
Low or zero rates for grain substitutes such as oilseeds and
-cakes, manioc and protein feeding stuff;
Medium rates for fruit, vegetables, vegetable oils and spices;
High rates for certain animals or animal products, but which
will have a minor or no impact on trade.
The low rates for the first three product categories give rise to- 11 -
g
tariff escalation with increasing stage of processing , which is
not shown in the table, since only raw materials are listed.
Concerning tropical beverages internal consumption taxes are more
important than trade measures for EC consumption and imports.
They differ widely between member countries and reach 40 per cent
for coffee in Germany (Cable, 1989, p. 14) and 110 per cent for
cocoa in Denmark and are limited to the regular VAT in other
countries.
Low or zero rates for oilseeds and other grain substitutes con-
stitute the price the EC had to pay to trading partners for ac-
cepting the EC variable levy system in combination with export
subsidies, which in principle are not allowed under GATT rules.
Because of high budgetary costs as a consequence of the diverging
protection rates for grain and substitutes, the EC several times
tried to negotiate a revision of these bindings, including that
for vegetable oils (see chapter 3 below).
A special regulation has been implemented for manioc which was
originally covered by the levy system of the grain market. But
the levy was bound to a maximum of 6 per cent of the cif value in
the Kennedy Round. With imports from Thailand growing sharply,
the EC negotiated a cooperation agreement with Thailand in 1982
g
of which the core was a VER on manioc exports till 1990 . Finally
it should be noticed that in all agricultural regulations a
safeguard clause is included which enables the Community to
promptly adopt in exceptional circumstances any measures needed
to defend the EC market against "serious" disturbance (OECD,
1987, p. 84).
8
For a principal analysis and empirical evidence for cocoa, soya
and palm oil see Dihm, 1989, Tangermann, 1989. For a comparison
of tariff rates for tea, cocoa and coffee and respective pro-
cessed goods see Menzler-Hokkanen, 1988, p. 94.
a
The quantities which could be exported to the EC at a 6 per
cent ad valorem tariff were 1982-1984: 5 mill, t p.a., 1985-
1986: 4.5 mill, t p.a. and 5.5 mill, t since 1986. The total EC
customs quota for all countries for 1989 is 6.825 mill, t
(Agra Europe Nr. 34/89, part III, p. 7-8). For details of the
regulations and legal aspects (GATT) see Hartwig/Tangermann,
1987, Menzler-Hokkanen, 1987, p. 103, and Sathirathai/
Siamvalla, 1987.- 12 -
Some special concessions were given for beef and cattle imports,
including imports of 211 000 live cattle from Austria, Switzer-
land, Yugoslavia at reduced customs duties and zero or reduced
levies (1988). 65 000 t of beef as an GATT import quota for fro-
zen beef, 504 000 t baby beef from Yugoslavia and 34 000 t
'Hilton'-beef (Schnoor, 1989, p. 16). The additional ACP-prefe-
rences will be discussed below. The potential impact of the CCT
tariff structure and of CAP regulations on DCs or certain country
groups and some other countries is further modified by prefe-
rences and concessions. The most important ones will be analyzed
in the subsequent section.
1.3 Preferences by Country Groups, Countries and Commodities
1.3.1 The General System of Preferences (GSP)
The EC's General System of Preferences was implemented on 1 July
1971. It is primarily intended to stimulate exports from DCs
Although its stated objective was to promote the industrializa-
tion of DCs, a limited number of processed and semi-processed
agricultural goods were made eligible for the GSP from the be-
ginning. Until 1980 the list has been expanded to more than 300
and in 1983, 385 agricultural products were covered by the GSP
(OECD, 1987, p. 26). In addition to DCs and overseas territories
some other countries such as the PR of China and Romania were
made eligible for preferences. Whereas for industrial goods the
GSP provides for duty free imports, for agricultural goods the
duties are only partially removed in general. Only imports from
LLDCs have completely been free of duties since 1977. Other than
for industrial countries, there are no quantitative restrictions
except for two types of raw tobacco, canned pine apple, cocoa
butter and instant coffee. The GSP preferential treatment for
fishmeal, raisins, coffee freed of caffeine and clover seed, with
a reduced rate for fishmeal and zero rates for the other products
is valid for LLDCs only. All preferential concessions are subject
For a detailed description and analysis see Weston et al.,
1980 and Weinmuller, 1984, p. 83.Bibliofhek
d@s Instituts fur Weitwirtschaft
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to a safe guard clause to prevent damage to EC internal markets
(Weinmuller, p. 85).
Comparing MFN to GSP rates the same pattern as for MFN (CCT)
rates itself becomes obvious: the higher the degree of proces-
sing, the smaller the preferential margin . With respect to
agricultural raw materials preferential margins are necessarily
small on average since MFN rates for major commodity groups are
often zero. What remains are slight reductions in the range of
1-2 per cent points for vegetable oils and fats and about 9 per-
centage points for spices (1982, unweighted; Menzler-Hokkanen,
1988, p. 76). For raw coffee the margin is in general 0.5 per
cent (1987, Amelung/Langhammer, p. 45) while 5 percentage points
apply to LLDCs. For cocoa beans the GSP rate is zero. The reduc-
tions for fruit and vegetables (fresh or chilled) are of partic-
ular relevance for the Mediterranean Countries and will be dis-
cussed below.
Trade effects to be expected are very limited for two reasons:
First, the GSP does not eliminate tariff escalation, which there-
fore, continues to impede imports of vegetable oils and other
processed or semi-processed agricultural products. Secondly DCs
are the only suppliers of a large part of the commodities in-
volved and the price elasticity of demand for these commodities
is quite low in the EC.
1.3.2 the Lome Convention
Out of the different parts of the Lome Convention only the trade
regulations with respect to agricultural commodities will be
discussed. The basic principle (Article 2) of the Convention,
that 'products originating in the ACP states shall be imported
into the Community free of customs duties and charges having
equivalent effects', is modified by section 2 of the same article
to the effect that ACP countries are granted only restricted
access to EC markets regulated by the CAP. These are in fact al-
1
1 See Amelung/Langhammer, 1989, p. 45; Menzler-Hokkanen, 1987,
p. 76.- 14 -
most all markets for agricultural commodities produced within the
EC. What results is a broad classification of products into three
categories (Koester/Herrmann, 1987, p. 11):
Products originating in ACP countries which can be imported
duty-free to the EC. These products are not produced within
the EC.
Products imported from ACP countries which are covered by the
CAP receive a product specific rather low preference margin.
Products covered by a special trade arrangement which offers
sizable preferences for some or all ACP exporters. These pro-
ducts are either CAP products like sugar and beef or non-CAP
products like bananas and rum.
Concerning the first category, it follows from the above discus-
sion of the GSP that duty-free access to the EC has hardly any
impact for agricultural raw products since the GSP and even the
MFN rates are very low if not zero. What remains are preference
margins for some processed categories of cocoa and coffee as well
as for vegetable oils. GSP rates for these products amount up to
13 per cent for some kinds of palm oil and palm kernel oil. A few
12 other examples are pineapples and tobacco
Preferences for ACP countries on CAP products are very limited.
For grains (corn, sorghum, millet, rice) a reduced levy applies.
Since the reduction, e.g. for corn is 1,81 ECU per ton only and
most markets are in a surplus position, hardly any effect could
be expected. The same holds true for beef and most fruit and
vegetables for which the border protection includes customs du-
ties plus a levy (see 1.1). Reduced or zero preferential customs
duties for these products will be offset by increased levies or
additional countervailing charges (fruit and vegetables), so
13 that the system is redundant, at least in surplus situations
1
2 For details see Amelung/Langhammer, p. 45 and Koester/ Herr-
mann, p. 13. Estimates for the value of ACP-preferences for
all countries could be found in "The Courier", No. 109 (May-
June 1988), pp. 5-10 (The Lome trade arrangements - What do
they do for the ACP's?).
1
3 For beef see v. Massow, 1984, p. 62, for details on fruit and
vegetables see Weinmuller, p. 110.- 15 -
The special trade arrangements such as these for sugar, beef,
bananas and rum are based on a philosophy which is definite dif-
ferent from the more general preferences granted to all ACP
countries. Traditional trade relations with a few countries were
given a special status with rigid quantitative and price regula-
tions .
Sugar
The EC sugar protocol which was negotiated already for Lome I,
was given a special status insofar as no period of validity was
14 specified . There are 21 eligible countries/territories with a
total import quota of 1,3 mill, t white sugar equivalent. This
quota amounts to about 12 per cent of total EC consumption and
was equivalent to an import share of about 75 per cent in 1987/88,
For this quantity suppliers receive at least the EC guarantee
price which is politically fixed yearly by the council of
ministers (see section 1.1). This quasi indexation of a raw
material price is an unique element in North-South trade re-
lations. The allocation of the total quota to preferred countries
was extremely lopsided. In 1979 ten countries received about 95
per cent of the total, five of them held a share of 91 per
15 cent . The share of quotas in production shows the relative
significance of the protocol for individual countries. Four
countries are allowed to sell 50 per cent or more on EC markets,
Mauritius even more than 70 per cent, whereas the share is
negligible for Kenya and India.
Beef
Beside some GATT quotas on frozen beef live cattle and 'Hilton
1
beef (see section 1.2) the EC allocated special export quotas for
beef to five ACP countries (Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Swazi-
land and Zimbabwe). Imports from these countries are duty free
except for a surcharge of 10 per cent of the regular import
For details of the contents and an evaluation see Gruber,
1987a, pp. 84; Koester/Herrmann, 1987, pp. 35; Koch, 1989.
See Koester/Herrmann, p. 77; for shifts of quotas between
preferred countries and the underlying regulations see Gruber,
1987a, pp. 90.- 16 -
levy. Preferences are granted under the condition that the ex-
porting states charge a duty of 90 per cent (of the levy) on
exports. The proceeds of this duty are to be used for promoting
the internal cattle industry (Schnoor, 1989, p. 19). The total
quota was set at 38 100 t in 1988. Major beneficiary was Botswana
with a quota of nearly 19 000 t. The share of ACP-imports in
total EC beef imports fluctuates between 3 and 5 per cent, and
that in EC-consumption around 0,4 per cent. However, the share of
the quotas in production and exports of the eligible countries
frequently surpass 50 per cent with heavy annual fluctuations
(Schnoor, 1989, p. 51; Koester/Herrmann, 1987, p. 43).
Bananas
Bananas are an important export item for quite a few countries
and for some countries the only export commodity. The CCT for
bananas is 20 per cent ad valorem including a 100 per cent pref-
erence for ACP countries. However, up to date it is implemented
only by the Benelux countries. There are highly segregated mar-
kets and trade regulations for other member countries of the EC,
such as Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom which have
historical reasons. The main suppliers of the UK are the Windward
Islands, Jamaica and Belize, those of France are Martinique,
Guadeloupe, Ivory Coast and Cameroon. Italy imports mainly from
Somalia and Germany is supplied by Latin American (non-Caribbean)
producers (Noichl, 1985, p. 64; Cable, 1989, p. 5). The legal
background for the market separation is given by Article 115 of
the Rome treaty allowing for a restriction of free circulation of
goods and by the Banana Protocol of the Lome convention. The
latter guarantees that "no ACP state will be placed, as regards
access to its traditional markets and its advantages on these
markets, in a less favourable situation than in the past or at
present" (Protocol No. 4, article 1) on the other hand. Thus the
special preferences for imports granted by France and the UK are
justified by the CAP (for French overseas dominians) and by ACP
rules (Stevens, 1988, p. 4). In France the banana market is com-
pletely regulated by a parastatal, the 'Comite Interprofessionel
Bananiais' (CIB) which ensures an absolute preference for fruit
from OD's and ACP countries. In the UK a government committee- 17 -
meets monthly to consider requests for import licences from non-
traditional sources (i.e. Central American fruit). Such licences
are only issued if Caribbean suppliers are unable to satisfy
demand. In Germany the banana market is basically free, given to
a duty free import quota of 500 000 t a year a small part of
which is set aside for ACP imports. As import quantities for 1987
show, only 5 000 out of a total import of 698 000 t have been
imported from non-Latin-American countries (Cable, 1989, p. 5).
The main reason could be seen in substantial cost and price
advantages of Latin American producers which range between 20 and
50 per cent (Stevens, 1988, table 2; Guignard, 1983, p. 78). With
respect to the completion of the Common Market in 1993 disman-
tling of internal market restrictions of the EC has to be accom-
plished. This is likely to have serious repercussions for the
traditional exporters to France and the UK unless new measures to
protect these producers are taken by the EC.
Rum
ACP rum exports to the EC are governed by Protocol No. 7 of the
Lome Convention, which provides for duty free quotas on the basis
of the largest quantities imported over the previous three years,
and above that, allows for yearly increases of 40 per cent in the
UK and of 18 per cent on markets of other member countries. The
ACP countries frequently were not able to exploit their quotas
(Koester/Herrmann, 1987, p. 32; Weinmiiller, 1984, p. 114).
1.3.3 Agreements with Mediterranean Countries
The common core of the basically bilateral agreements , which
were the result of the 1972 EC-plan for a global Mediterranean
policy, is the free access to Community markets for manufactured
exports (except sensitive products) plus some concessions for
The countries included are: cooperation agreements with Alge-
ria, Tunisia, Marocco (Maghreb) from 1976 and with Egypt,
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon (Mashrek) from 1977. Association
agreements with Malta (1971) and Cyprus (1973), Turkey (1964);
free trade agreement with Israel (1975) and a special cooper-
ation agreement with Yugoslavia (1980).- 18 -
17 agricultural commodities . The latter have been negotiated by
the mediterranean countries (and conceded by the EC) to protect
their traditional export markets in the EC, which were increas-
ingly endangered by the results of the CAP. The commodities of
particular importance were fruit and vegetables, some of which
have quite a high share in total exports of some countries, as
the following data (per cent) show for 1982 (Musto, 1988, p. 64).
citrus fruit Marocco: 7,3; Israel: 7,0
olive oil Tunisia: 8,9
tomatoes Marocco: 3,6
The EC concessions mainly comprise reductions in customs duties
in the range of 30-80 per cent, and the rate is zero for some
minor non-competing products such as spices (Weinmuller, pp. 126;
Musto, p. 62). Since the normal EC market regulations (the
reference price system, a licensing system and the option of
temporary import restrictions) nevertheless apply (see section
1.2), a clear advantage for producers in member countries have
been maintained. This became particular important after the
Southern Enlargement of the EC, when beside Portugal and Greece
an important producer like Spain, with a large production poten-
tial, entered the EC. The anticipated trade diversion on the
markets of fruit and vegetables with potentially severe conse-
quences for the Mediterranean non-member countries led to adapted
trade and cooperation agreements with the above mentioned coun-
tries (except Malta and Syria) signed on 1 September 1988 (EG-
Kommission, 1989, p. 127). The main new element is the implemen-
tation of duty-free-import quotas, which are to be determined on
the basis of average previous exports calculated for a number of
representative years {Musto, 1988, pp. 74). Since the regulations
of the EC market order have not been changed, however, the extent
of trade diversion to be expected, depends - not the least - on
the price policy pursued by the EC. Preferential treatment, of
Mediterranean Contries will, nontheless, have a detrimental ef-
fect on the exports of fruit and vegetables of other suppliers to
the EC, in particular the United States.
For a discussion of the political and economical background
and the development of the EC policy towards mediterranean
countries see Pomfret, 1986.- 19 -
2 Impact on Developing Countries
2.1 Some Methodological Problems
To establish the impact of EC-agricultural policies on DCs,
reguires some methodological remarks with respect to type and
coverage of studies available. In particular two main questions
have to be addressed:
Which EC-agricultural policies have an impact on DCs? The
theoretical or qualitative answer seems to be straight for-
ward: all of them. However, against the background of the
policy outline given above, it becomes plausible to assume
that the quantitative impact in terms of trade-, transfer- or
welfare effects differs markedly. Although the GSP, the Lome
Convention, the Meditarranean policy and several other agree-
ments between the EC and different DCs are 'DC specific' their
aggregate impact is dominated by the CAP. Since within the CAP
the price policy is dominating, the vast majority of empirical
studies is concerned with the effects of the EC-market and
1 ft price policy . This leads to the second question.
What are the relative advantages/disadvantages with respect to
the comprehensiveness of studies, e.g. numbers of policies
and/or countries (regions) included in the empirical analysis?
First, given a certain technical limit of the dimension of a
model, there is a well known trade-off between the extent of
details included and, e.g. the number of policy intruments, sec-
tors, regional unities and linkages explicitly modelled. A highly
aggregated global agricultural sector model could miss important
details with respect to a very heterogeneous intrasectoral
protection structure and, therefore, will give biased welfare
estimates. On the other hand, the same is true for a detailed
agricultural sector model without endogeneous closure with
1 ft
Realizing that not only price policy but e.g. structural-,
agricultural social- and even regional policies have distor-
ting effects on the allocation of resources, the OECD by now
publishes yearly estimates of producer- and consumer subsidy
equivalents as a more comprehensive indicator for distortions
in the agricultural sector of OECD countries (OECD, 1989).- 20 -
the non-agricultural sectors and with exogeneous exchange rates,
if the agricultural sector has an important share in the economy.
Secondly, given the EC agricultural policy as an heterogeneous
set of policies in itself and as an integral part of globally
interdependent policy actions, two other analytical problems
arise. The results of partial approaches assuming isolated na-
tional policy actions, would be misleading, if reactions
(retaliation) of other countries (trading partners) appear to be
likely. A unilateral liberalization of the CAP is extremely un-
likely; if at all it would be undertaken in close reciprocity at
least with the major competitor, namely the United States.
Similar problems could arise even at the national level, if sin-
gle policy intruments and/or markets are to be analysed. Findings
may be misleading if policy measures are closely linked and -
correspondingly - narrow substitution possibilities exist between
different product and factor markets. An example for the first
case is the logical link between the CAP on the one hand and the
agricultural provisions in the Lome Convention or Mediterranean
policy on the other. A complete dismantling of the CAP would make
special regulations for sugar or beef exports to the EC super-
fluous, i.e. the analysis of a liberalization of the CAP should
include the termination of related Lome and other special provi-
sions. The second case concerns the analysis of a single commod-
ity market with close substitutability in consumption or pro-
duction to other markets. Given significantly differing pro-
tection rates for substitutes, the estimation of the social cost
curve - diverging from the private cost curve (supply curve) for
the commodity in question - is difficult. Very often, even a
theoretical (qualitative) answer with regard to the direction of
the effects of e.g. a reduction of the border protection on wel-
fare is difficult to deduct. Against the background of these very
general qualifications a cautious interpretation of available
19 empirical studies seems indispensable . Out of the set of
policies described above, the GSP and general preferences resul-
19
A review of more recent empirical work could be found in Win-
ters (1987), Demekas et al. (1988), Valdes, 1987.- 21 -
ting for members of the Lome Convention would not be discussed
explicitly as major trade- or welfare effects can not be
expected.
2.2 CAP and the Level and Volatility of World Market Prices
The vast majority of agricultural commodities cultivated within
the EC is covered by CAP regulations. Since the dominating ob-
jective is income protection of farmers and producer price pro-
tection is still the main intrument, the most important direct
and indirect effects on trade partners - compared to a reference
system without CAP - are as follows:
The EC net exports of agricultural commodities (net imports)
are higher (lower); the magnitude depends, in addition to
supply and demand conditions, on the nominal (for consumers)
and effective rates (for producers) of protection, which vary
widely between commodities and over time. Since these rates
are about zero for grain substitutes, the trade effects have
the opposite direction in this case.
- As a consequence world market prices for agricultural commod-
ities are depressed on average (across commodities and over
time).
Lower world market prices lead in the first round and under
'ceteris paribus
1 conditions to welfare gains for net importers
and to losses for exporters of agricultural commodities. However,
this general theoretical result is difficult to verify empiri-
cally even within this partial framework of agricultural markets.
It demands internationally linked country models with demand and
supply conditions disaggregated for commodities produced, con-
sumed and traded because this as well as the national protection
structure varies widely between countries. Simplifications - to
avoid complexity - by analysing e.g. trade liberalization for
country groups could produce misleading results. This is espe-
cially valid, if demand and supply functions are not modelled
explicitly and rather net export- or import functions are esti-- 22 -
mated. For reasons mentioned above the derivation of trade- and
welfare effects from single commodity models is even more ques-
tionable (Gans, 1989, pp. 14).
But even multicommodity multicountry sector models cannot catch
the effects of policy changes in the agricultural sector on the
non-agricultural economy which comprise e.g. changes in product
and factor markets, in income and the foreign balance and ex-
change rate. This is of particular relevance if policy changes
are large and/or the agricultural sector has an important share
in the economy. Both of it has to be assumed discussing the con-
sequences of the dismantling of CAP on DCs, since the first would
20
be true for the EC and the latter for DCs. The adequate ap-
proach to fulfill the above requirements would be the linkage of
general equilibrium models for all countries (regions). What
could be expected theoretically compared to results of single
sector models is a - in general - more positive effect of CAP
liberalization on third countries, since the large efficiency
21 gains to be expected within the EC would be partly passed to
trade partners through increased demand for imports and higher
exports of non-agricultural commodities with respective price
effects on world markets.
In the following the results of only a few studies, which, with
respect to comprehensiveness and disaggregation come near to the
20
The most comprehensive and actual overview on protection of
the agricultural sector in OECD countries could be found in
OECD, 1989. On the concept used - the calculation of producer
and consumer subsidy equivalents - see OECD and Tangermann et
al., 1987.
21
Conservative estimates of the economic costs of the CAP point
to a range from 11 billion ECU for 1978 (BAE, 1985, p. 107) to
24 billion US-$ for 1985 (Tyers and Anderson, 1986). A more
recent estimate from the same authors for the average of 1980-
82 figures at 8.9 1985 billion US-$ {Tyers, Anderson, 1988, p.
211). These estimates differ widely because of
(1) from year to year fluctuating world market prices and US-$
exchange rates;
(2) differing commodity and policy coverage;
(3) differing types of models, assumptions and methodology.
For a more thorough discussion see Winters, 1987 and Demekas
et al., 1988.- 23 -
requirements described above, could be discussed. First, esti-
mates of welfare effects will be presented and thereafter prob-
lems of price instability, which actually has to be seen as one
aspect of the welfare argument, will be outlined. One of the most
detailed agricultural single sector, multicountry models i.~~
which frequently updated simulation results are presented, is
22 that of Tyers/Anderson . It involves 30 countries or country
groups and differentiates 7 major commodities, which account for
about half of world food trade. Not included are soybeans and
other feed grain substitutes, a shortcoming with respect to the
important intrasectoral distortions in the protection structure
of the EC. The model has dynamic elements and is partly
stochastic as production uncertainty is included. Policy is to a
certain extent endogenized; the same is true for stockholding.
Another shortcoming and a potential reason for underestimating
welfare gains of DCs is the ommission of certain tropical com-
modities (Valdes, 1987, p. 583).
The major effects derived for a phased liberalization of the EC
policy on world market prices, trade and welfare have the theo-
retical expected direction. World market prices would rise be-
cause EC net exports decline. The net welfare gain for the EC per
year (average 1980-82) would amount to 8.9 billion 1985 US-$. The
magnitude lies within the range of estimates mentioned above, but
should be a definite underestimation in so far, as e.g. only
price protection is abolished and important commodity groups such
as grain substitutes, fruit and vegetables are not included. The
aggregated impact on DCs is a welfare loss of 2.3 billion 1985
US-$, which could be higher for the same reasons. If one rates an
23 isolated liberalization by the EC implausible and, therefore,
liberalization of the agricultural policy in all industrial mar-
ket economies is simulated, the result for DCs again is a loss of
2.3 billion US-$. However, the world as a whole would gain in the
22
Here the version described in Tyers/Anderson, 1988 is discus-
sed.
23
Isolated liberalization might even have detrimental effects.
For a discussion of 'disharmonies' between US and EC agricul-
tural policy see Koester et al., 1988.- 24 -
order of 16.2 billion US-$, which would give room for compen-
sation. The reason for the unaltered result for DCs is the level
and structure of protection applied by other important ex- and
importers, i.e. the United States and Japan. Since the main wel-
fare losses for DCs are brought about by increasing world grain
prices, the effect of an inclusion of the US is very small be-
cause the protection rates are low and in addition combined with
supply restrictions (set aside programs).
Estimates by other authors with comparable models have yielded
similar results. A liberalization of the CAP would bring about
small losses for DCs as a group (Matthews, 1985). The results
vary necessarily depending on assumptions particularly made with
respect to supply and demand reactions. Although small on average
the losses or gains for individual countries could be substan-
tial. Lome countries being major beneficiaries of preferential
import regulations for beef and sugar, would loose their advan-
tages with a termination of EC price protection. Other examples
for 'loosers' of a CAP liberalization are the exporters of
manioc, particularly Thailand. The net income gain for this
country because of the dramatic increase in EC demand caused by
the CAP is estimated at 110 mill. US-§ for 1980 (Nelson, 1988, p.
60) .
To evaluate these general results for DCs, three aspects must be
discussed in greater detail.
(1) A liberalization of the CAP would have to start from a situ-
ation, characterized by seriously depressed world market
prices as a consequence of protectionist policies in ICs and
even NICs. Because of a long period of adjustment to low
world market prices for food commodities, production and the
degree of self-sufficiency are much lower in DCs than they
would be under liberal market conditions. The situation is
frequently aggravated by indirect effects on the agricultural
sector from other (in particular) import substitution poli-
24 cies in the non-agricultural sectors . Such non agricultural
For a discussion of the problem and empirical evidence see
Krueger et al., 1988.- 25 -
policies imply a tax on the agricultural sector, in particular
the exporting branch, and lead to a negative effective pro-
tection. Whether this policy has been encouraged by low world
market prices and, therefore, low returns to agriculture is not
clear. In any case the low food production is the cause of the
calculated welfare losses for DCs as the result of a liberali-
zation of the CAP. Increasing world market prices could, however,
stimulate food production in food importing countries and bring
about a reversal of food trade flows for many countries (Hart-
mann, Schmitz, 1987, pp. 346), which would be even more
pronounced if detrimental policies pertaining to other sectors
are corrected. What follows is a certain likelihood of over-
estimating the negative impact of food price increases on the
world market on DCs when only first round effects are accounted
for. Similarily, an analysis which includes in addition a
liberalization of DCs policies, but is limited to agricultural
sector policies, would not give reliable results (Valdes, 1987,
p. 582) .
(2) Another likely reason for biased welfare estimates with re-
spect to a CAP liberalization is the effect of the CAP on
price instability. As will be argued below, more stable world
market prices could be expected. These would reduce risk for
producers directly or would make national or international
stabilization schemes, which are all but costless, at least
partly unnecessary. Hence, more price stability is (ceteris
paribus) likely to reduce costs and increase production,
reduce world market prices and increase global welfare. Al-
though these effects are widely accepted among analysts, the
quantitative dimension is difficult to measure and, there-
fore, is usually not included in welfare estimates.
(3) The most important shortcoming of models discussed so far is
their missing interfacing with the rest of the economy. A
pronounced efficiency and income gain within the EC should
have second round effects on trading partners. These would be
triggered through increased demand for imports as well as
higher internal production and exports by the EC with favour-
able terms of trade effects for non EC countries. This macro-
economic dynamic effects of liberalization would become the- 26 -
more important, the more the protection system of the EC - as
was observed - shifts from a simple border protection to nu-
merous internal interventions without having similar direct
effects on trade partners as the original policy.
Because of the complexity required to model all the intersectoral
and international relations necessary to trace the above effects,
only few modelling efforts have been undertaken to date. In their
internationally linked general equilibrium model Burniaux and
Waelbroeck (1988) basically confirm the effects of a liberal-
ization on agricultural markets derived from other modelling
efforts. In addition, they analyze the macroeconomic linkages and
arrive at the conclusion, that even DCs would achieve net income
gains on aggregate were the agricultural policy to be liber-
alized in Europe. This result is not supported by simulations
with the food model of IIASA (Parikh et al. 1988). DCs continue
to loose as a group. Although this modelling effort comprises
internationally linked models with detailed agricultural sectors,
the dynamic macroeconomic effects of a CAP liberalization (see
(3) above) might not be captured adequately, since the non-
agricultural economy is aggregated to only one commodity. In
addition, both other arguments mentioned above, which could lead
to an underestimation of the welfare increases, seem to be valid,
too. However, the IIASA work concentrates on distributional
aspects within DCs (hunger!) which cannot be discussed in this
context.
Price instability
Finally, a dismantling of the CAP system with variable levies and
export restitutions respectively would lead to more stable world
market prices since shortages and gluts could be smoothed out
over a much larger numbers of agents. This result is theoreti-
cally plausible and unanimously supported by respective empirical
studies . However, some reservations must be made. First, dis-
cretionary government stock and trade policy as well as adequate
0 R
For an overwiew and some qualifications see Winters, 1987, p.
41.- 27 -
formulations for producer reactions have to be included in the
analysis. Government could have eliminated or, at least, reduced
detrimental effect of the CAP trade system on stability of world
market prices. On the other hand, lagged producer reactions on
prices could lead to cyclical price patterns which, e.g. were
observed on the world sugar market. An unhindered reaction of EC
producers to world market prices could have increased cyclical
price fluctuations (Schrader, 1982). Nevertheless, the results of
adequate empirical analysis show significant destabilizing ef-
fects of the CAP in ex post simulations, which have been partic-
ular strong on the markets for wheat and ruminant meat (Tyers/
Anderson, 1988, p. 207).
2.3 Special Trade Arrangements
In the following the likely impact of some special EC measures on
DCs will be analyzed. The approach is essentially partial, i.e.
not trying to work out all the interdependencies of the real
world. This should be kept in mind when assessing the results
from various studies.
The Lome Sugar protocol
The concession of the EC granted under the Lome sugar Protocol,
i.e. imports of 1.3 mill, t of sugar (white sugar equivalent) per
year free of duties or levies from ACP countries at EC interven-
tions prices, could basically be understood as a product tied
income transfer to eligible countries. In fact, this transfer
could become negative at times when the EC sugar price is below
the world market level since the regulations include an obliga-
tion for delivery. The magnitude of the transfer per country
depends on the multiple of the quota allocated and the price
differential between EC and world market price (which fluctuates
widely). The cost of freight, loading and insurance have to be
substracted, to arrive at the net transfer value. As long as one
assumes that global production and consumption remain unchanged
by the protocol, the calculation is straight-forward. The maximum- 28 -
total transfer calculated along these lines has been estimated at
nearly 200 mill. ECU for 1981/82 (Koester/Hermann, 1987, p. 41),
which could be considered a 'normal
1 year with respect to price
differentials.
The distribution of quota rents between beneficiaries is ex-
tremely uneven not only in absolute terms but also per capita and
particularly if the latter figures are related to income measures
such as per capita GNP in the respective countries . These di-
stributional effects cannot be justified given the goal of offi-
cial development policies to help the poor. The sugar policy is
not costless, even under the assumption of unchanged production
and consumption. The costs of the arbitrary shipments of sugar
initiated by the regulations have to be covered on a global
scale. Moreover, the assumption of unchanged production in eli-
gible countries seems unjustified, since several governments pay
prices to producers, which lie above their shadow price (world
market price). The additional production caused by this policy
will depress world market prices with detrimental effects par-
ticularly for non-eligible sugar exporters (World Bank, 1986, p.
143). However, the isolated global allocative effects of the
sugar protocol have to be judged with caution. It is difficult to
assess what the EC internal sugar (price) policy would look like
if there would not be an obligatory import of 1.3 mill, tons of
sugar per year. Globally speaking it is safe to state, though,
that quantitative restrictions of trade will allways distort the
allocation of production and consumption between countries and
cause losses of efficiency.
Preferential beef import quotas
The principal economic evaluation of preferential import quotas
for Botswana, Kenya, Madgascar, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe can be
Some values for 1981/82 in ECU:
a) per country: Mauritius 75.8 mill.
Malawi 3.0 mill.
b) per capita, same countries: 79.8
0.5
c) GNP/capita, same countries: 1255
201
(Koester/Herrmann, 1987, p. 41).- 29 -
carried out along the same lines of the analysis of the sugar
27
protocol . They reflect attempts of the EC to mitigate the det-
rimental effects of its protectionist policy on some of the tra-
ditional poor beef exporting countries in Africa. Quota rents are
determined by price differentials between the EC and world mar-
kets, actually exported quantities and related shipping costs.
Since most of the allocated quotas have not been fully used ,
the effective economic rents are significant smaller than the
potential ones, which were estimated to amount to just over 40
mill. ECU gross value for all four countries together in 1979
(Koester/Herrmann, 1987, p. 44). The main beneficiary is
Botswana, which has a share of 19,000 tons equal to 50 per cent
of the total quota. Similar to ACP sugar producers, it has been
shown for beef producers that they get part of the quota rent via
higher prices with respective allocational consequences. Although
it can hardly be doubted that quota owning countries benefit from
the regulation, it is very difficult to establish their net wel-
fare position compared to a liberalized EC beef policy. Re-
spective estimations indicate that beneficiaries are better off
with the present regulation but could easily be compensated by
29 other beef exporters, which stand to gain from a liberalization
(v. Massow, 1984, pp. 137). What makes things worse is the fact
that - similar to the sugar protocol - the distributional conse-
quences among and within DCs are arbitrary.
3 The CAP and the GATT Uruguay Round
Since the publication of the famous book 'World Agriculture in
Disarray' by D. Gale Johnson in 1973 the situation has not been
?7
For a detailed evaluation of beef import quotas, see Massow,
1984; Gruber, 1987b; Schnoor, 1989.
For the details of likely causes see Schnoor, 1989, pp. 42.
2
9 Koester/Herrmann (p. 45) argue that Kenya would be better off
with free trade.- 30 -
improved but rather worsened . The development in world agri-
culture is characterized by - often high and strongly diverging
protection rates between countries and commodities
permanent and increasing violation of multilateral trade rules
(e.g. MFN GATT-rules) and their substitution by bilateral
agreements between countries and country groups, and as a
consequence
increasing distortions in the global allocation of resources
and trade flows.
In former GATT negotiations on the liberalization of trade, ag-
ricultural trade was more or less omitted. This issue figures now
prominently on the agenda of the ongoing Uruguay Round. The rea-
son is a growing awareness of the damage done particularly to
traditional food exporters and to the international trade system
by bilateralism in general and by specific trade practices de-
veloped by the EC and the US in particular, which are frequently
characterized as a trade war.
When consensus was not reached at the Mid-term Review Meeting in
Montreal (December 1988) participants of informal consultations
reached agreements on some general declarations and objectives in
Geneva during spring 1989:
'Agricultural policies should be more responsive to international
market signals in order to meet the objective of liberalization
of international trade and that support and protection should be
progressively reduced and provided in a less distorting manner'
(OECD, 1989, P. 65). And, 'a reform process should be initiated
through the negotiation of commitments on support and protection
and through the establishment of strengthened and more operatio-
nally GATT rules and disciplines'. Some long terms objectives are
explicitly mentioned, for which proposals should be submitted by
participants till December 1989:
Of)
The recent reduction (1987-1989) of high positive protection
rates is merely a consequence of temporarily increased world
market prices; these are not caused by a change in policies
but by random production short falls in North America.- 31 -
(1) the terms and use of an aggregate measurement of support;
(2) strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and
disciplines;
(3) the modalities of special and differential treatment for
developing countries;
(4) sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and the related work
programme;
(5) tariffication, decoupled income support, and other ways to
adapt support and protection;
(6) ways to take account of the possible negative effects of the
reform process on net food-importing developing countries.
In addition, participants agreed on rules with respect to short
term actions of trade partners till cue ...^ oi the negotiation.
Such are: trade partners 'ensure that current domestic and export
support and protection levels in the agricultural sector are not
exceeded
1 and 'that tariff and non-tariff market access barriers
in force at the date of this decision are not subsequently in-
tensified in relation to import of agricultural products, in-
cluding processed agricultural products'.
These very general declarations and objectives point in the di-
rection of a more efficient allocation of resources on the global
scale. With respect to objective (1) visible progress has been
reached, since the concept and use of PSE and CSE as a measure of
support is widely accepted, even if some questions e.g. which
national policies should be included and whether there should be
given a rebate for production control measures (e.g. area set
aside programs, production quotas) is still on debate. Objectives- 32 -
(3) and (6) reflect in particular the likely impact of a
liberalization on DCs. As has been discussed above the estimated
negative impact of a liberalization on food importers should be
judged with caution. Moreover, the special and differential
treatment of DCs in the field of trade policy have to be viewed
sceptically given the background of experiences in the past dec-
ades (Bhagwati et al., 1987).
However, to date no ways have been disigned to realize the com-
monly agreed reduction of protection and the liberalization of
trade. Several academic proposals on an adequate calculation and
later stepwise reduction of PSE's and CSE's or the transformation
of all kind of protectionist measures into tariffs , which could
be bound in the GATT and equally be reduced by negotiations have
not been adopted.
The reason for the present deadlock in GATT negotiations with
respect to agriculture has mainly to be seen in the still con-
32 trovers positions of the EC and the US . The US in there latest
proposal returned to earlier positions, which basically opts for
free trade after a transition period of 10 years; export subsi-
dies should be abolished within 5 years. After the transition
period only that internal measures, which have minor impact on
For an overview and the discussion of technical and political
problems see Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 1988, pp. 30.
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For a discussion of a possible coordinated liberalization of
agricultural trade and its advantages see Tangermann 1988,
Koester 1988 and International Agricultural Trade Research
Consortium, 1990.- 33 -
production and trade should be allowed, e.g. direct income pay-
ments or environmental protection programmes. The EC on the other
hand, only after tedious internal quarrel, proposed a reduction
in the aggregate support of 30 per cent till 1996. Since the
reference year is 1986, a year with a very high support level,
the proposed reduction is very small related to the effective
level of 1989. In addition it is proposed to give LDC's a special
treatment. This is in accordance with a proposal of the 'Cairns-
Group' , which pleads for compensatory measures towards net-food
importers among DCs. This suggestion has to be viewed as a com-
promise since several DCs (e.g. Brasil, Thailand) are members of
this group which otherwise represents the interests of important
food exporters. As food exporters are suffering from escalating
export subsidies paid by the EC and the US, their negotiating
stance is close to the US free trade position.
To date, the chance that the negotiations would be terminated
with a significant reduction in protection levels and a reorien-
tation towards multilateral GATT rules seem to be faint. The
massive agricultural lobby within the EC determines the nego-
tiating position of the EC. It is supported by other countries
with high rates of agricultural protection like Japan on the one
hand and quite a number of DCs which are beneficiaries of spe-
cial EC import regulation for sugar and beef or traditional net
food importers. The insight that potential winners of a
liberalization of agricultural trade could easily compensate
potential loosers does not seem to be a sufficient condition for
freer trade in agriculture.- 34 -
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